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A simple model of buyer search in an urban housing market is employed t,o 
demonstrate that if some whites are unwilling to sell housing to blacks com- 
petitive equilibria in which blacks pay more for housing than whites are 
sustainable. The model is also used to consider a number of issues in the 
literature on housing discrimination. Most important, it is shown that in 
equilibrium the housing market will be racially segmented under a wide 
variety of conditions. 
1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
There are few areas in u-hich economic theory explains economic reality 
more poorly than in the relationship between housing prices and race. 
Both casual and formal empiricism strongly indicate that in many urban 
areas blacks receive housing services on terms inferior to those obtained 
by whites.* Yet the housing market appears to be competitive, and a 
number of models of competitive markets in which there is assumed to 
be white prejudice against living near blacks imply that competitive 
cyuilibrium in such markets will only be established when blacks receive 
housing on terms more favorable than those obtainable by whites.3 Two 
solutions to this apparent contradiction have received wide attention in 
1 Conversations with John R. Chamberlin, Alan V. Deardorff, and Sidney G. Winter 
were instrumental in the preparation of this paper. Harvey E. Brazer, participants in 
the Public Finance Seminar at The University of Michigan, and participants in the 
May 1975 conference of the Inter-University Committee on Urban Economics made 
valuable comments on an earlier draft. Edwin S. Mills made valuable comments on the 
penultimate draft. 
* See, for example, Kain and Quigley [S], King and Mieszkowski [lo], Rapkin [la], 
and Muth Cll]. 
3 For early statements of such results see Becker [2], Bailey [l], and Muth [ll]. 
Courant Cd] and Rose-Ackerman [14] have extended these results to explicit,ly spatial 
models. The literature is summarized in Courant and Yinger [4]. 
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the literature. Becker [2] and Haugen and Hrins [Ci] haw suggested that 
we have observed a persistent disequilibrium, deriving from the fact that 
the rate of growth of the black population has bce~~ faster t)han that of th(b 
white. Unfortunately, this rate of growth hypothesis is seriously incom- 
plcte, in that it does not explain why black immigrants to northern citicls 
should do any worse in the housing market than any ot’hcr immigrant, 
group. This defect can bc corrcctcd if it is assumed that blacks arc 
prevented, by some mechanism, from acquiring housing in the white> part 
of the city. Rain [7] and Rain and Quiglcy [S] have argued that whites 
force blacks to pay a premium to live in xvhito neighborhoods, but they 
have not explained horn this would lead to a segmctntc~d market, unless 
all whites exhibit such discrimination evrn whew there are profits to bo 
made from dealing with blacks. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the housing market 
in which thtr long-run compc6itivc equilibrium, if there is aversion among 
only some whites to living with and dealing with blacks, may involvct a 
segmented market with all blacks receiving housing on terms inferior to 
those obtained by whitrs. That prejudiced whites would like the market 
to be organized in this way has never been disputed. The problem, 
succinctly stated by Mut’h [11] is that’ in a comp&itive mark& collusion 
must break down and direct aversion t)o dealing with blacks will not’ b(> a 
profit maximizing mode of behavior if some whites arc not avcrsc to 
dealing with blacks. In S&ions 2 and 3 a simple model of housing starch 
will be employed to demonstrate that aversion on the part of some whites 
to dealing with blacks can lead to equilibria in which blacks pay higher 
prices than whites for housing. Writher collusion nor unanimity of 
prejudice arc required. In Section 4, t’ht: discussion will be expanded to 
include, ‘real estate agents and arbit)rageurs (blockbusters). Finally, in 
Se&on 5, some‘ welfare implications will be discussed. 
Two important sets of issws which arc potent~ially relevant t’o t’hn 
discussion will not bc dealt) with in this paper. The discussion takes place 
only in the context of the market for owner-occupied single-family 
housing. While most of thr material in the search model will also apply 
directly to rental housing, the material on real estate agent behavior will 
not apply as directly. J’urthcrmorc, the market for rental housing in 
multiunit buildings poses the added problem that’ the landlord, at lcast 
with respect to his building, is not a perfect, competitor. A thorough 
discussion of the implications of this fact can be found in Yinger [17]. 
2. THE HOUSING SEARCH MODEL 
2.1. Buyer Search ill. a Housirly Market without Racial Prejudice 
The model of t,ht> housing market in which th(t subwqwnt discussion 
will take place has the following properties : 
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1. Houses are characterized by a joint distribution of a multitude 
of characteristics. No explicit functional form for this distribution is 
assumed. 
2. The prices of all of the characteristics are in perfect LLhedonic” 
equilibrium, and are known to all. Thus if the vector of (annual rental) 
prices is P and the vector of characteristics is H, for house i, the yearly 
value of house i will simply be P.H;. This price will bc posted and it is 
at t’he capitalized value of this price that the seller will sell. 
3. Buyers have utility functions defined on a consumption com- 
modity and the vector of housing characteristics H. On entering the 
market, they compute the utility that they would obtain if they found 
a house with just the vector H which maximized their utility at prices 
P and their incomes. 
4. Buyers also know the multivariate distribution of housing units 
as a function of the characteristics. Knowing their utility functions, 
knowing this distribution, and assuming that they have prior information 
sufficient to screen out houses below some positive utility level, they 
compute a distribution of utilities which would be derived from purchas- 
ing houses in the market. This distribution is denoted f(V), where V is 
utility derived from housing. It meets the standard condition that 
J “v f(V)& = 1, (1) v 
where _V is the lowest utility associated with any house to be looked at, 
and v is the value of the utility function found under the maximization 
procedure described in assumption 3. The cumulative distribution of 
f(V)is F(V). 
5. There are enough houses ‘(on the market” at any given time so 
that the issue of waiting for more houses to appear does not arise.4 
6. There is a constant cost of looking at one house, denoted c. 
It should be noted that although t’he market characterized by assump- 
tions 1 to 6 is simple it is not degenerate. Given that buyers have different 
tastes over housing characteristics there will be a distribution of housing 
charact’eristics available in the market and hence a nondegenerate f(V) 
facing each buyer. These distributions will not “spike” unless the market 
offers only one type of house. 
At any stage of the search process, the value of the buyer’s utility 
4 Of course, at some price, any house is “on the market.” What is meant by t,hat 
phrase in this context is that the owner is actively seeking to sell the house at the price 
P.H. 
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function as he contemplates making one more search is given by : 
I 
V” 
V = max 
1 -c + (1 - F(V/,))E(VIV 2 V”) + V”F(V/,) . 
(2) 
In (2), Vo is the utility associated with the best house that has been 
found thus far. The second line is the expected utility after one more 
search. It is the probability of finding a better house times the expected 
utility of better houses conditional on finding such a house, plus the 
probability of not doing better times the utilit’y of not, doing better 
(i.e., utilit’y of the best house thus far found), minus the cost of search, 
defined in terms commensurate with utility. (Note that it is implicitly 
assumed that there is no cost of reserving the best house found thus far. 
If there were such a cost, the optimal stopping point, discussed below, 
would be further from 8.) 
A rational buyer stops starching when the first’ line of the right-hand 





(V - V”)dF. (3) 
JJO 
At this point, the expected gain in utility deriving from further search 
will be just equal to the loss in utility associated with the cost of search. 
Equation (3), for a given f(V), will define an optimal Vo at which to 
cease search. This value of Vo will be denoted V*. 
The value of V*i for a given buyer i depends on the form of fi( Vi), the 
value of vi, and the value of vi. Assuming that’: 
(1) utils are mcasurcd in dollars (and the marginal utilit’y of income 
is constant in the range under consideration) ; 
(2) the cost of search for a household looking at $30,000 houses 
(houses with an annual value of $3000 at a 10% discount rate), is $30.00 
per house searched ; 
(3) .v is $2000, implying that a buyer looking at houses with annual 
values of $3000 will not look at something worth less than $2000 to him; 
and 
(4) the distribution of f(V) is rectangular between V_ and P; the 
value of V* is $2755. This means that if one pays $30,000 for a house, 
there is some house (which may or may not exist in fact) for which one 
would pay $2450 more, with the same utility function and the same 
income, if the house could be found, but it is not worth looking for. 
6 This is the familiar sequential search rule derived in Rothschild [15]. 
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While these assumptions are arbitrary, their end result seems to be 
plausible. People stop searching short of their “dream house,” even if 
that dream is defined within a current budget constraint. The amount 
that they stop short, about $20 per month in rental value for a family 
earning perhaps $15,000 per year, is not unreasonable. 
2.2. Seller’s Aversion in the Model 
Seller’s aversion is introduced int’o the model wit’h the following 
assumptions : 
1. There are 1% neighborhoods in a city, indexed (j = 1, . . . , n). 
2. For each neighborhood j in the city in which there are whites 
who have houses for sale, blacks perceive that there is a nonzero proba- 
bility (rj) that whites in that neighborhood will be unwilling to sell to 
them at current market prices.” The probability that blacks will be un- 
willing to sell to other blacks at current market prices is assumed zero. 
The probability that a black searching in neighborhood j will find an 
averse seller, then, is yj times the fraction of sellers in neighborhood j 
who are white. This probability will be denoted arj. 
3. There is variation in (Ye across the n neighborhoods. 
These assumptions are weak. Given an indexing of neighborhoods, 
they arc met in all U. S. cities. Further, Schelling [lS] has shown that a 
random distribution of households by race will not lead to uniform racial 
composition by neighborhood. Thus, given t’he existence of some whites 
who are unwilling to sell to blacks at a given set of market’ prices for 
housing, even a random distribution of t’he population by neighborhood 
will lead to variation of CY across neighborhoods. 
Without loss of generality, we may order the neighborhoods j by their 
values of (Y, such that crl I CQ, . . ., <cY,~, and (Y~ < CL,,. Any black 
household i contemplating search in the housing market will have the 
choice of searching in any of the n, neighborhoods. His utility at any 
state of the search process, analogous t,o Eq. (2) of the previous section 
of this paper, will be given by : 
VO 
-cl+(l--ol~~(l--F~(Vo~~E(v~IV~LV,~+(~-a~~VoF~(Vo~+ulV” 






where all terms ar(’ defined as brforc and subscripts dcnotr neighborhoods. 
6 The value of yj will in general be a function of market prices, among other things, 
and issues related to determination of yj are discussed below. All that is necessary for 
the current argument, however, is that “/j be nonzero at prevailing market conditions. 
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The effect of seller’s aversion is to t’ake cuj of the densit’y fJ (I’) and put 
it at V = 0. This reduces expected benefits of search in neighborhood j, 
or, alternatively, increases costs. On average, a black searching in ncigh- 
borhood j will have to look at l/l - aj houses for every house hc has the 




(Vj - V*j)G?F,. 
1 - Ctj J7*j 
(5) 
Consider (4) and (5) under the assumptions (to be relaxed later) t’hat 
the distributions fj(V) are identical in all neighborhoods and that the 
cost of search is the same in all neighborhoods, Under these assumptions 
the effect of seller’s aversion is that blacks never search for housing in 
neighborhoods with values of LY greater than al. Equations (4) and (5) 
may be rewritten as (4’) and (5’) : 
1 
VO 
-c+ (1-cul)(1-F(v,))E(VIV2Vo)+ (1 -w)Vo~(Vo)+~IV~ 







v (V - V*j)dF (j = 1, . . .) n). (5’) 
1 - CYj V*j 
By inspection, for any value of Vo, the last n lines of (4’) are strictly 
decreasing in (Y, as is V*j in Eq. (5’). Thus, if housing prices are identical 
in all neighborhoods, bla,cks will only search for housing (and only buy 
housing) in those neighborhoods where LY is lowest. If there are any 
neighborhoods that are all black, blacks will search only in these neighbor- 
hoods, as the value of LY in such neighborhoods is zero. Under these 
assumptions, then, as in Schelling’s model, turnover in the housing 
market will lead to racially segregated neighborhoods, although not 
necessarily to a single “ghetto.” 
But prices need not be constant in all neighborhoods under these 
assumptions. In particular, any nonzero value of a! greater than al will 
be consistent with a market equilibrium in which (1) neighborhood 
housing prices are a decreasing function of the value of a obtaining in the 
neighborhood ; (2) blacks never search in neighborhoods with values of 
a greater than cul; such that (3) there is nothing to equilibrate prices in 
different neighborhoods at a uniform level. 
The maximum equilibrium price differential between neighborhood 1 
and neighborhood j can be found as follows : 
(I) In Eq. (4’), as in Eq. (2), solve for the value of V* that represents 
the optimal stopping point for search in neighborhood 1. 
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(2) For a given value of ayj add to the distribution of ut’ilities in 
neighborhood j the utility of lower prices. Thus, still assuming that the 
distribution of utilities from the distribution of housing in the two 
neighborhoods is identical, if the distribution of utilities in neighborhood 
1 is given by (1 - o~~)j(V), the distribution in the neighborhood j is 
given by (1 - q)f(V + Dj), w h ere Dj is the utility of t’he difference in 
prices. Furthermore, while utilities in neighborhood 1 are distributed 
from v to p, those of the neighborhood j go from v + Dj to p + Di. 
Thus, the distribution in neighborhood j is f(V), reduced by the fraction 
(1 - oli), and shifted to the right by Dj. 
(3) Substitute the value of V*l calculated in step (1) int’o the 
distribution of utilities found in step (2). 
(4) Solve Eq. (6) for the value of Di at which V*j will be equal in 
neighborhood j and neighborhood 1: 
J 
*V+Dj 
C = (1 - Ctj) (V - V*,)f(V + D,)dV (j = 2, . . ., n). (6) 
v*1 
At these values of Di (denoted D*j), all searching strategies implicit in 
Eq. (4’) will be just equal in utility when the value of the best house 
found during search is V*l. At any value of Dj less than D*j, search in 
neighborhoods where 01 is equal to crl will dominate search in the neighbor- 
hood j. Furthermore, inspection of Eq. (6) makes it clear that D*i is an 
increasing function of CY~. Thus t’hree propositions are established under 
the assumptions of the model: 
1. Seller’s aversion, defined as the unwillingness of some whites to 
sell their houses directly to blacks under a given set of market conditions 
is consistent with a price differential in which housing is purchased by 
blacks in black neighborhoods at higher prices than those obtaining in 
white and integrated neighborhoods. 
2. The maximum price differential is an increasing function of the 
fraction of white sellers in a neighborhood who are averse to dealing 
with blacks. 
3. If the price differential obtaining in a neighborhood is less than the 
maximum, blacks will never search in that neighborhood, so there will 
be nothing to eliminate market segmentation by neighborhood racial 
composition. 
It should be noted that these results do not imply that blacks will 
necessarily receive housing on terms inferior to those received by whites. 
They do imply that such differentials, within certain limits, will be 
consistent with equilibrium, and that the size of the maximum equilibrium 
differential, ceteris paribus, will be a monotone increasing function of the 
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0.2 44 0.015 
0.5 101 0.05:3 
0.7.5 245 0.082 
0.9 797 0.270 
fraction of the white population which is averse to dealing wit’h blacks. 
In other words, assuming that there exist’ all white and all black neighbor- 
hoods and that the value of cy in all white neighborhoods is (Y,, blacks will 
not search in white neighborhoods unless the price differential is greater 
than D*,. As long as D, is less than D*,, the housing market will be 
“segmented” in that there will be geographically and economically 
distinct racial submarkets. 
The empirical importance of the result stated above cannot be evalu- 
ated without’ making assumptions about the functions and parameters 
involved. Making the same empirical assumptions as were made in Section 
2.1, and assuming that thrra exist neighborhoods for which the value 
of (Y is zero, some relationships between D*, and a, are seen in Table 1. 
Thus, at least for the rectangular distribution and the parameters of 
the model used to obtain what appeared to be a plausible result in 
Section 2.1, the effect of thr pcrcent’agn of whites in all white neighbor- 
hoods unwilling to deal with blacks is striking. ?rTot only can prejudice 
of this form affect the prices paid by blacks adversely, but a high incidence 
of prejudice will generate a great deal of adversity-. 
3. IMPLICATIOKS AND EXTENSIOKS OF THE MODEL 
3.1. The Rate of Gmwth Hypothesis and Neiqh,borhood Tipping 
Viewed in light of the search model presented above, t’hc rate of growth 
hypothesis becomes plausible as a contributing factor to t,he establishment 
of equilibria in which blacks pay more for housing, rather than as a 
description of disequilibrium. As blacks migrated to northern cities, they 
had the option of searching for housing in t#hr whit’e or black neighbor- 
hoods. As long as D, was less than D*w, they searched only in black 
neighborhoods. But migration and population growth increased the 
demand for housing in black neighborhoods, raising prices in t,hese 
neighborhoods, leading to D, greater than D*,, and inducing blacks to 
search in white neighborhoods. Blacks would then move into housing in 
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heretofore white neighborhoods, but only as long as the price of housing 
in black neighborhoods was such that D, was greater than D”,. 
The model also shads some light on the issue of neighborhood “t,ipping.” 
Once blacks began purchasing housing in a given white neighborhood the 
value of (Y in that neighborhood would fall for two reasons. First’, those 
whites who arc averse to dealing with blacks are likely to he averse to 
living with them. They would thus have a strong incentive to sell to 
blacks in order to leave the neighborhood. As (Y was perceived by blacks 
to be falling, the neighborhood would become relatively more attractive 
for search, and prices would tend to rise toward black submarket prices, 
providing a monetary incentive for whites t,o sell to blacks. Thus once a 
neighborhood begins to “tip,” both supply and demand considerations 
would enhance the process until equilibrium in the urban area was restored 
at a value of D, equal to D*,. That such t,ipping would take place at 
locations adjacent to black neighborhoods is predict’ed by the “border” 
models of Bailey [l], Courant [3], Rose-Ackerman [14], and others, in 
which it is shown that white prejudice against living near blacks causes 
the price of housing in u-kite neighborhoods to be lowest in border areas. 
(This has been confirmed by King and Miesekowski’s empirical study 
[lo].) Thus, when D, is greater than D*a, blacks will search first in 
border areas because the price differential between t,he black interior and 
other neighborhoods is largest in border areas. This will lead to expansion 
of the black neighborhoods at their borders so that such geographic 
segregation as exists can be expected to be preserved when the market 
adjusts to values of D, great.er t.han D*,. 
3.2. Self-Seyreyation us Rational Search. 
Consider a stylized case in which there are white neighborhoods, border 
neighborhoods, and black neighborhoods. If tvhites in border neighbor- 
hoods are no more averse to dealing with blacks than whites in white 
neighborhoods, the value of a! in border neighborhoods u-ill be less than 
that in the white neighborhoods because border neighborhoods contain 
blacks and whites. Thus the value of D* in the border neighborhoods will 
be lower than D*,., but greater than zero. If blacks are faced with identical 
distributions of ut,ilities in the three types of neighborhoods, it would be 
consistent with equilibrium in the search model if prices paid by blacks 
were lower in border neighborhoods than in all black neighborhoods. 
King and Mieszkowski [lo] found such a configuration of prices, and 
argued that their finding provided evidence of a black t,aste for self- 
segregation. However, in the context of the search model, such a finding 
may be interpreted as the result of optimal search behavior on the part 
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of black buyers (renttlrs). This does not, imply that blacks do not have a 
taste for self-segregation, but, it dew suggwt, a plausible altcw~atiw 
explanation for King and Allic~szkowski’s findings. 
3.3. Different Utility Distributions 
Up to this point, it has been assumed that’ the distributions fj(V) are 
identical across neighborhoods. (see Eq. (4’).) In the following discussion, 
that assumption is dropped, in which case the maximization problem for 
black searchers is that embodied in Eq. (4). However, the value of D*j 
which will equate t)hc last 17 lines of Eq. (4) will now depend on the 
distributions fj(V) as well as upon the values of cyj. 
Indeed, in an extreme case, blacks with certain t’astes will have cqui- 
librium values of D*, that are zero or negative for some neighborhoods j. 
Under these circumstances, such blacks will search in the neighborhood 
where D*j is lowest (V*j is highest) and will be willing to pay t’he same 
or higher prices for housing t’han those paid by whites. But they will 
not, in general, get as much for their money as whites. If we consider a 
white and a black with identical tastes, searching over the same distri- 
bution of houses in a white neighborhood j, the white’s optimal stopping 
rule is defined by solving for 1’” such that 
c= 
.i 
“ (1” - V*)dFj. (7) 
v* 
The black’s optimal stopping rule, however, will lead him to solve 
for V* such that 
Clearly, if cx is positive, V* will be lower for the black. While prcjudiw 
may or may not be reflected in housing prices in this case, it will affect 
the level of utility achieved by blacks. Such effects may be very difficult 
to measure in the market, but the model suggests that they exist, and, if 
cx is large in neighborhoods where f(V) is otherwise highly favorablt for 
some blacks, these utility effects may be important. 
Furthermore, in less extreme cases, the existence of a positive value of 
OL will, over some range of differences in t’he distributions of utilities, 
induce blacks to limit their search to black neighborhoods even though 
the distributions of utility from housing that exists in white neighbor- 
hoods is more favorable. Herr again, not, all of the loss in utility will 
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appear as a differcncc in market prices, although some of it’ will. In the 
special case where the distribution of utilities in a white neighborhood j 
is just equal t’o the distribution in a black neighborhood shifted to the 
right by D*j and multiplied by 1 - aj, t’here will be no price differential, 
but whites will on average receive D*j more of utility than bIacks with 
identical tastes. In t’he special cast of Section 2.2, all of the utility differ- 
ence is reflected in prices. 
In any event, to the extent’ that the distribution of utilities derived 
from housing in some white neighborhoods is, in the absence of seller’s 
aversion, more favorable than that found in black neighborhoods, the 
results of Section 2.2 concerning maximum equilibrium price differentials 
must be modified. The unfavorable terms on which blacks search in white 
neighborhoods need not lead to price differentials. However, such price 
diff ercntials as are measured (including zero differentials) will, in general, 
understat#e the loss in black utility caused by white wllcr’s aversion. 
4. INSTITUTIONS IN THE MARKET-REALTORS 
AKD ARBITRAGEURS 
Although the modifications discussed above imply that there may not 
be price differentials for all types of housing, the unmodified model of 
Section 2.2 will apply where the distribution of housing types over which 
a buyer starches (both owner-occupied and rental) is similar in both 
black and white neighborhoods. For low and moderate income housing, 
it’ would appear that the unmodified model will be more applicable for 
many Northern cities. Given this, the question arises as to whether 
market specialists will find it profitable to engage in arbitrage activities 
such that price differentials cannot bc maintained in long-run equilibrium. 
The issue at hand has been succinctly stated by Muth [ll, p. 1071 as 
follows : 
. . . if real-estate agents Fail to deal with potential Negro buyers because of 
their own preferences, they will make Fewer sales and earn lower incomes. It 
would thus be in the interest of renters or sellers of real estate to sell out to 
others without an aversion to dealing with Negroes; by so doing l,hey would 
increase their incomes, since potential buyers without these aversions would 
offer more than the capitalized value of the business to the landlords or real- 
estate agents who are averse to dealing with Negroes. 
The purpose of this section will be to show that in the context of a 
search model with racial prejudice there will be important market forces 
inhibiting both real estate agents and arbitrageurs (blockbusters) from 
capitalizing on the opportunities implicit in the above quotation. 
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4.1. Simple Arbitrage ilr the Search Model 
At lcaxt two important market forces tend to make arbitragc~ unprolit- 
able in the owner-occupied market. The most’ obvious stems from the 
transactions cost’s of buying and selling housing. Less obvious arc co& 
associated with persuading blacks to look for housing in a neighborhood 
where CY has a high value. We deal with t’he labtrr problem first. (Again, 
the discussion will take place in the cont.rxt of the owner-occupied 
market, although the mechanisms involved apply equally well to the 
rental market. Furthermore, in t’hr rental market, there are additional 
costs of racial transition, if whites are prejudiced, which are esamined 
in Yinger [17-J.) 
Given that the effect of seller’s aversion is to reduce the efficacy of 
search in white neighborhoods, if D, is less than D*, for a given value 
of (Ye blacks will not search in white neighborhoods at all, and the market 
will be segmented into racial submarkets. Thus, one problem confronting 
a middleman attempt,ing arbitrage between black and white submarkrt 
prices will be to find and induce a buyer in the black submarket to look 
at housing in the white submarket in the first place. Indeed, given that 
the value of D,,. is less t.han D*,+., the image of blacks frantically searching 
for housing in white neighborhoods, ready to jump out of the ghetto at 
any time, is quite misleading. In fact, rational black consumers of housing 
will never search in whit,e neighborhoods, because it. is not worth it. t.o 
do so. An arbitrageur must overcome this problem in ordrr to turn a 
profit. While it is difficult to estimate how expensive this difficulty will 
be in fact, it would seem that the necessary advertising costs (as well as 
social st.igma associated wit,h such advertising, in high cy neighborhoods) 
could be considerable. Clearly, however, when D, is grrater than D*%., 
this will not be such a problem, and the action of such arbitrageurs will 
be equilibrating, subject to the qualifications deriving from standard 
transactions cost,s which are discussed below. 
In order to ply his trade, the arbitrageur must buy a house, hold it, 
and sell it. In so doing, he incurs the purchase price in the white sub- 
market, denoted P,-H, for a given vector H, plus transactions costs 
borne by the buyer which are some fraction tb of the purchase price. In 
addition, he foregoes the use of (1 + fb)Pw.H during the period when the 
house is on the market but not yet sold. In return for incurring t,hesc 
costs, he receives a maximum of (Pw + D) ‘H, minus any transaction 
costs (ts) borne by the seller times the sales price. (D is measured here in 
money, rather than in ut,ility, and is a vector of price differenbials for the 
characteristics. Furthermore, the prices are capitalized asset, prices rather 
than annual rental prices. Otherwise the notation follows that of Section 
2.1) If r is the interest rate, and m the number of months he expects to 
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hold the house before it is sold, profits on such a transaction will be 
II = (1 - L)(P, t D)aIf - P,.H 1 -I- ; (1 + ttJ.7 
( > 
WI 
If it is assumed that the arbitrageur uses none of his time, or values 
his time at zero, in making such transact,ions, the value of D.H at’ which 
such activity has zero profits will be the minimum value at which it will 
take place. Under what would seem to be fairly generous assumptions 
about the parameters affecting the profitability of such arbitrage, namely, 
that the I’S both equal 0.03, that r is 0.12, and that m is one month, 
profits will be zero when D.H/P,.H is about 0.07. In other words, the 
price differential between the two submarkets would have to be at least 
7y0 of white prices before such arbitrage could be profitable. This is a 
rather large differential for a market to generate as a long-run equilibrium. 
Yet it would appear that there is nothing in the market’ to make it or its 
welfare implications go away. 
Furthermore, in those cases where the distribution of utilities in the 
white submarket is more favorable than in the black, the thing to be 
arbitraged is utility, and not prices. It is hard to conceive of an economic 
mechanism that would do the job. 
4.2. Real Estate Agents in a Search Model 
Two sets of considerations tend to prevent the activities of real estate 
agents from eliminating price differentials deriving from the search 
models of Sect’ion 2. One is idealogical, and has been documented by 
Helper [5], Yinger [lS], and the National Academy of Sciences [12], 
among others. A generous interpretation of the professional ideology of 
real estate brokers regarding racial integration is that it is a violation 
of professional ethics to introduce a black into a white neighborhood if 
the agent perceives that the result will simply be to leave everyone un- 
happy with his neighbors.8 Somewhat less generously int,erpreted, the 
ideology is racist. 
Reinforcing these ideological considerations are direct economic reasons 
to prevent realt.ors from introducing blacks into neighborhoods where (Y is 
7 For a landlord, the situation is somewhat different, as he will receive rents while the 
racial composition of occupancy changes. Thus the opportunity costs term will not be 
as large. However, the loss in white rentals due to white prejudice has no analog for 
the owner-occupier case. (see Yinger [17]). The net effect of these two phenomena may 
be either positive or negative, but, in any event, as is seen below, the opportunity cost 
term is unimportant, relative to transactions costs, for plausible parameters of Eq. (9). 
8 I am indebted to Jerome Rothenberg for this formulation. 
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Assume that rraltors have good informat,ion about thr distribution of 
housing characteristics and about the racial prcfcrcnces of whites in 
part’icular neighborhoods. Assume further that, thr housing market is 
organized as in Section 2.2, that, the value of ZI,” is not high clnough to 
make arbitrage profitable, that the value of D, is Irss than D*w, and that 
information about the aversion or absence thereof of individual sellers is 
not coded into the multiple list,ing file. Rrcall that when there is multiple 
listing the commission is divided bctwecn the listing agent, and the selling 
agent,, who may be the same person. 
Under these conditions, neither the listing agent nor the selling agent 
has an incentive to show housing in white neighborhoods to blacks. The 
listing agent would incur the clnmity of the neighborhood, and, as reputa- 
tion and rcferals are an agent’s stock in trade, at least, as far as getting 
future listings goes, it, is difficult to see how the value of finding a buyer 
for one t.ransaction which is expected to occur in any event could outweigh 
t’he loss of potential future business which would accompany such a 
transaction. The selling agent, even if he does not expect, to obtain 
listings in the neighborhood and is thcrrforc not directly concerned with 
local opinions of his behavior, perceives a number of obstacles to showing 
a house in a white neighborhood to blacks. I+‘%, he has t.o confront tho 
same search problem faced by a buyer in the simple model of Section 2- 
he knows the probability that a sale can be made to his client, but docas 
not know with certainty that such a sale can be made. Second, hc: is 
concerned with the reputation of realtors generally, as, under multiple 
listing, the fraction of transactions in t,he city which are made through 
realtors is important to all realtors. Finally, it’ is valuable to reahors to 
be on good terms with other realtors. Yingrr [18] cites a number of 
studies which document situat,ions in which realtors have “punished” 
other realtors for introducing or att,empting to introduce blacks into 
white neighborhoods. 
The possibility that the preferences of the individual seller will in fact 
bc coded into the multiple listing file changes this analysis rather lit,tle. 
Given that the listing agent in a high QI neighborhood does not lvant the 
house shown to blacks his behavior will depend on whether he believes 
that subscribers to the multiple listing file will “honor” his wishes. If 
he believes that they will do so, he can simply code all listings as being 
“whites only,” regardless of his client’s wishes. If he believes that some 
of his competitors would show the house to a black in spite of his injunc- 
tion not to, it is in his interest to simply not code racial preference at all, 
ret,urning the selling agents bo thr case discussed above. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS ASD IMPLICATIONS 
Given that there is seller’s aversion on the part of some whites, and 
that blacks incur costs in searching for housing, the following results 
have been established : 
(1) Where the housing stock over which blacks search is similar in 
both black and white neighborhoods, there can exist a long-run equi- 
librium in which blacks pay more for housing than whites and do not 
search in whit,e neighborhoods. Thus the market can remain segmented 
in a long-run competitive equilibrium. This conclusion differs from that 
of Kain and Quigley in that segmentation in their work is directly 
assumed. Here it is shown to be consistent’ with the workings of a com- 
petitive housing market. 
(2) The transactions costs involved in the housing market are such 
that racial price differentials will not, in general, be arbitraged away, 
although arbitrage will place an upper limit on the maximum equilibrium 
differential. 
(3) There are a number of reasons, both economic and sociological, 
to expect that the real estate brokerage industry will not, act so as to 
eliminate such differentials. 
(4) Whether or not arbitrageurs and real est’ate brokers act so as to 
eliminate such differentials in the price dimension, blacks whose utility 
distributions are more favorable in the white submarket than in the 
black will receive, in long-run equilibrium, less utility from housing than 
will identical whites. There is no plausible market mechanism which will 
eliminate such utility differentials. 
The welfare implications of these results are quite serious, especially 
when they are compared with the welfare implications of other economic 
models of racial prejudice in housing markets. In virtually all of the 
earlier published models, long-run equilibrium can be characterized as a 
situat,ion in which whites pay for their prejudice, in that they receive 
housing on terms relatively less favorable than those obtaining in a non- 
prejudiced equilibrium, and blacks receive housing on terms relatively 
more favorable than those implicit in a nonprejudiced equilibrium. The 
models presented here imply that’ just the opposite situation may occur. 
Furthermore, the increasing upward mobility of blacks will tend to 
accentuate the difficulties faced by blacks in obtaining housing on terms 
equal to t’hose obtained by whites. As long as blacks are searching in a 
lower middle income market’, where the distribution of houses available 
in the white and black submarkets is essentially similar, there is at least 
the possibility that arbitrage and the actions of some brokers will tend 
to place upper limits on price differentials and perhaps IW:II bid them 
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away. Indeed, in casts there where t)ho distribution of housing charac%er- 
istics is intrinsically more favorable in black neighborhoods, and whit,w 
do not compete for housing in such neighborhoods, it may be that blacks 
can obtain such housing on nondiscriminatory terms. 
For those (presumably morC affluont) blacks for whom the distribution 
of housing charact’eristics is relatively favorable in white neighborhoods, 
however, there will be no market mechanisms operating to provide them 
the housing which is best suited to their preferences on the same terms 
that’ such housing is available t’o whites. This will have tlvo serious 
consequences. First, such blacks will enjoy less utility in the market. 
Second, they will stay in the black submarket, competing for housing 
bett’cr suited to less affluent blacks, unless the distribution of utilities in 
the white submarkct is substantially more favorable than that in the 
black submarket. In so doing, they themselves will rcccive housing less 
suited to their tast’cs than they would if there wew no seller’s aversion, 
and they will also bid up the price of housing available to other blacks, 
reducing their utility as well. 
This paper has developed a model of the housing market in which 
racial segmentation of submark&, resulting in blacks receiving housing 
on relatively unfavorable terms, can result as a consequence of rational 
behavior in a competitive market. This is in direct’ contradiction to 
competitive models of housing markets with racial prejudice found in 
t,hc earlier literature on the subject. UnfoAunately, this paper is in direct 
conflict with those models in another sense as well. They imply that 
racial justice will cvrntually obtain as a result of the working of natural 
market forces. There is no such comforting implication to bc found in 
the work reported upon here. 
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